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The purpose of this study was to develop a conceptual framework to enhance the 
redesign of a safety system. To identify the limitations of the current safety system, the 
concepts of congruency and integration of the safety function within a specific university 
environment were examined through a case study methodology. An emphasis was placed 
on the use of models from business and management literature for both the examination of 
the concepts and the subsequent development of the conceptual framework for the 
redesign. The researcher emphasized the use of multiple data sources in this study. These 
sources included: observations, documents, and interviews. A model from French and Bell 
(1990) was used to examine congruency which included interviewing two stakeholders 
associated with executive driven planned organizational change processes as well as the 
safety manager. A perception survey, as suggested by Petersen (1994), was developed and 
used as part of the examination of safety system integration and administered to twenty 
interviewees along with the safety manager. 
The findings provided evidence of gaps which may be hindering the success of the 
safety function within the organization. By examining organizational direction and 
comparing those findings to the findings representing the direction of the safety function, 
gaps in congruency were found. Integration gaps were discovered, in part, through 
examination of the safety process input, as described by the safety manager, as well as the 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The need for change within an organization can be driven by the identification of 
gaps in performance, adaptability, and opportunity. A performance gap suggests the need 
for restructuring dimensions such as quality of service, costs, and administrative systems. 
An adaptability gap suggests the need for reshaping the dimensions of guiding models, and 
processes. An opportunity gap suggests the need for revitalizing the dimensions of 
marketing of services, strategic direction, and efficacy of resources. Improvement in these 
three areas can produce a value creating environment which is necessary for growth 
(Boehringer, 1996; Fahey and Randall, 1994). Viewing an organization as a system can 
facilitate finding gap information. The systems approach suggests that an organization is an 
open system, an integrated whole, composed of interdependent parts and elements which 
interact with one another and with their constantly changing environment so that a certain 
identity is maintained (Dicle, 1969). The safety function can be viewed as an 
interdependent part or element within an organization in its mission to prepare, preserve, 
and protect organizational resources from risk, danger and loss (Ve ltri, 1990; Harrison, 
1987). As such, the leadership of that function must create ways to interact with various 
other elements within that system to minimize gaps and ultimately develop a safety system 
that creates value for the organization's mission (Creswell, 1987). 
The traditional safety management approach that a number of safety managers 
continue to practice offers an example of a gap in many dimensions (Veltri, 1990). The 
impetus for this traditional approach is to assure compliance with regulatory requirements. 
This approach to safety focuses on a crisis management strategy emphasizing short term 
fixes. This strategy is entrenched in a mentality of deferred intervention, i.e., wait until 2 
there is a loss producing incident, new regulation enacted, or a citation from a regulatory 
body issued before action is taken. The action that is taken is generally of a controlling 
nature which may inhibit improvement through enhancing resistance to change (Ansoff and 
McDonnell, 1990). Additionally, this approach maintains a reactive posture, i.e., 
protection from an external factor (regulatory compliance) as opposed to a proactive 
posture, i.e., driven by desire to contribute to the competitive performance of the 
organization. This model lacks activity in dimensions such as: service quality to customers, 
use of contemporary guiding management models, and strategic or long term direction. 
Various models have been introduced into organizations with the purpose of 
restructuring, reshaping and revitalizing the organization. Many of these models present 
application opportunities for the safety function. Several of these models emphasize both a 
customer service and a process perspective (Peters, 1987; Manganelli and Klein, 1994; 
Fahey and Randall, 1994). For safety, a customer service perspective would place 
emphasis on satisfying the internal customer or employee as an antecedent for satisfying the 
external customer, the end user of services provided by the organization (Grant and 
Schlesinger, 1995). Pierce (1995) suggests that the definition of customer of the safety 
function includes management at all levels, other staff functions, and line level employees. 
A process perspective places emphasis on examination of the interrelationship of providing 
services and information with the facilitation of receiving these services and information. 
This process approach allows an end-to-end view of how best to structure, sequence, and 
measure safety activities to reach targeted outcomes (Davenport, Jarvenpaa, and Beers, 
1996). Viewing the management of safety as a process shows the relationship between 
functions within an organization. 
The concepts of both congruency and integration are, also, crucial strategic 
considerations to the success of any design for safety. The term fit, congruence, or 
alignment refer to the extent to which the behavioral or organizational requirements and the 
constraints in one part of a system are compatible with those in another (Harrison, 1987). 3 
The more the tasks, technology, and environments of other units vary from oneanother, 
the more the structures become differentiated. Once organizations become differentiated 
internally, they face serious problems of integration (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). In 
emphasizing both congruency and integration in the design for safety, assessing 
opportunities for closer linkages with customers is crucial. Deep-seated attitudinal issues 
that underlie the current state of the safety process must be acknowledged. Stakeholders in 
the entire safety process must see each other as partners instead of adversaries (Peters, 
1987). This emphasis helps shift safety away from a compliance driven model to a more 
business performance model. 
The purpose of this study was to perform an assessment of the safety system at 
University X (the name has been changed to maintain anonymity). Gaps in various 
dimensions of the safety system had to be identified. Concurrently, the intent was to move 
away from any remnants of a traditional model of safety management and toward a model 
emphasizing customer service, systems view, and process orientation. Gap information 
was gained through the examination of both the aspects of (1) congruency of the safety 
function with organizational direction evidenced in the ongoing planned organizational 
changes, and (2) integration of safety and its processes into the organizational environment. 
Subsequent to this, a conceptual model to guide the redesign of safety was developed. 
1.1 Statement of the Problem and the Subproblem Tasks 
The problem involved in this study was to develop a conceptual framework that 
enhances the redesign of a safety system. The model was applied to a university using a 
case study method. There were four main subproblem tasks to resolve in this study. The 
four subproblem tasks were: 
1. to understand the strategic direction of planned change at University X and to 
understand the current design for safety at University X; 4 
2. to understand the knowledge/perceptionfmteraction of safety related activities as 
viewed by the customers of those processes; 
3. to identify gaps in (1) alignment between executive driven organizational changes 
and the current design for safety and; (2) safety design and activity integration 
into the organization based on the knowledge/perceptionfmteraction findings; 
4. to recommend a design for safety to help minimize gaps and achieve congruency 
with planned organizational change and integration of the safety design into the 
organization's overall system. 
1.2 Limitations 
This study was limited to the assessment and application of models and concepts to 
an organization undergoing dramatic planned organizational change. Planned organizational 
change encompasses an executive driven agenda, generally devised for the purpose of 
improving business performance. The term dramatic is used to represent change that is 
intended for the whole of an organization and details significant change in how the 
organizational mission is accomplished. 5 
2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
As a research strategy, the case study is used in many settings including 
organizational and management studies. The case study contributes uniquely to the 
knowledge of an organization through the desire to understand complex social phenomena. 
It allows an investigation to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life 
events such as organizational and managerial processes. Case study methodology is the 
preferred methodology when "why" and "how" questions are being posed about a 
contemporary set of events suggesting that operational links need to be traced. The method 
is preferred in examining contemporary events, but when the relevant behaviors cannot be 
manipulated. The case study's unique strength is its ability to deal with a full variety of 
evidence, i.e., documents, artifacts, interviews, and observations (Yin, 1985). 
Case study methodology emphasizes a grounded theory construction. Strauss (1987) 
describes grounded theory as the discovery of theory from the data through the general 
method of comparative analysis. Qualitative data is placed into categories and then, through 
constantly comparing the content of them, defines the properties of the categories until they 
have taken on an abstract form. These conceptual categories, in turn, are then related to 
each other according to the discoveries made in the data. 
Construct validity, reliability, and external validity are quality of research design 
tests to integrate into case study methodology. The two case study tactics available for this 
study to increase construct validity are: (1) using multiple sources of evidence in a manner 
encouraging convergent lines of inquiry, and (2) having the draft reviewed by key 
informants. Reliability is the demonstration that the operations of a study can be repeated, 
with the same results. For this to happen in a case study method, the researcher must 
document the procedures followed throughout the entire case study process. The test for 
external validity deals with the problem of knowing whether a case study's findings are 
generalizable beyond the immediate case study. Case studies rely on analytical 6 
generalization. In analytical generalization, the investigator is striving to generalize a 
particular set of results to some broader theory (Yin, 1985). 
Three case studies were examined in the development of this research. The criteria 
for selection were either that safety was a part of the research, and/or a questionnaire was 
developed by the researcher as part of data gathering, and/or a model was developed based 
on the research, and an organization was the focus of the study. One study examined 
changes in a large utility company's health and safety function from a longitudinal, 
retrospective perspective. In this study, a perception questionnaire was developed and 
administered (Rose-Hearn, 1991). In "The Transformation to aLearning Organization: A 
Case Study," Madden (1993) examined the degree of success of an organization attempting 
to improve its efficacy by aligning the strategy and structure with Senge's The Fifth 
Discipline (1990). In Madden's research, two questionnaires were developed, one for each 
of two target groups for data gathering. In Dicle's (1969) dissertation, "Systems Theory 
and Organizational Change," a thorough literature search was done on the application of 
"systems thinking" to an organization in the process of change to both create a model to 
improve performance and test the model within an organization. 
There was a paucity of research on safety congruency or integration examination at 
a university. One author in the safety discipline was found describing strategy, structure, 
and strategic planning (Veltri, 1990; Veltri, 1991). Pierce (1995) has explored the 
application of total quality management (TQM) principles to the discipline of safety. Most 
reference material and related research came from disciplines outside of the safety field. 
These resources focused on organizational change,reengineering, strategy, structure, 
congruency, integration, managing resistance to change, organization development, and 
systems theory from business and management literature. 
Several resources were found with an emphasis on systems, process, and 
customer. In both Manganelli and Klein's (1994), The Reengineering Handbook and 
Fahey and Randall's (1994) The Portable MBA in Strategy a radical change strategy 7 
utilizing a systems view, a process orientation, and customer service model were 
emphasized. Davenport, Jarvenpaa, and Beers' (1996) "Improving Knowledge Work 
Processes" and Dicle's (1969) dissertation entitled "Systems Theory and Organizational 
Change" provided insightful models for strategy development utilizing a systems view and 
emphasizing intradepartmental organization. The discipline of organization development 
was explored through the work of Beckhard and Harris (1987) in Organizational 
Transitions: Managing Complex Change and French and Bell (1990) in Organization 
Development: Behavioral Science Interventions For Organization Improvement. These 
resources offered useful models to facilitate examination of various aspects of 
organizations and for devising methods for improving effectiveness. 
2.1 The Examination of Safety Congruency 
For an element of an organizational system to contribute to the business 
performance standards of an organization, familiarity with the overall corporate and 
strategic intention is imperative. This is a part of viewing the organization as an interrelated 
system as suggested by Dicle (1969). When changes are taking place within an 
organization, the safety leadership must evaluate the changes and new direction of the 
organization to look for gaps by comparing the direction of the safety function with that of 
the organization. This suggests examining the dynamics of organizational change, the 
expected impact on the direction of the organization, and the subsequent formulation of a 
new design for safety to minimize congruency gaps. 
Examining details of organizational processes can provide insight into what is going 
on and how it is being accomplished. Understanding these details in an organizational 
system can identify the need for change in the resident safety function to improve 
congruency within the organization. The processes described in the French and Bell (1990) 
model are central to effective organizational functioning, are of a ubiquitous nature in 
organizations, and are frequently focal points for problems. Understanding these processes 8 
and their expected outcomes offers a glimpse into the dynamic operating systems of a 
facility and can be an important source of information that could assist in improving how 
the safety function fits into the organization. 
There are eight organizational processes described in the French and Bell (1990) 
model. They are: 
1. communication patterns, styles, and flows to provide insight into how a 
process has been manifest; 
2. goal setting or setting task objectives and determining criteria to measure the 
accomplishment of objectives which includes development of a mission 
statement 
3. decision making, problem solving, and action planning activities and the 
outcome for those affected; 
4. management of conflict resolution to include interpersonal and intergroup 
situations; 
5. managing interface relations both within a process and between stakeholders 
and other groups; 
6. supervisor and staff relations and examination of the extant leadership styles; 
7. technology and engineering systems examination including: information 
systems, policies, procedures, and technological systems; 
8. strategic management which includes strategic planning, strategy 
implementation, and the long term viability of the organization to remain 
competitive and effective. 
2.2 The Examination of Safety Integration 
Fahey and Randall (1994) suggest that managing internal integration across the 
organization can have a dramatic effect on success. This suggests that managing the 
integration of safety can profoundly impact organizational success. It has been 
demonstrated that a gap in most safety programs is the lack of knowledge of how people 
perceive and react to safety requirements. This lack of understanding may have resulted in 
programs that have focused on attempts to "engineer" solutions to what were actually 
symptoms of behavioral and management system problems (Bailey, 1993). This lack of 9 
understanding about the performance and outcomeof safety policy and procedures 
suggests that the safety leadership lacks a grasp of the needs and desires of its customers. 
Additionally, organizational barriers to safety integration need to be discovered and 
eliminated. In order to facilitate improvement an evaluation process is needed. Petersen 
(1994) suggests the use of perception surveys to measure effectiveness and identify 
weaknesses of safety programs. This can be augmented by other data collection methods to 
facilitate barrier discovery. 
2.3 Designing the Future State of Safety 
Several models exhibited desirable characteristics for consideration in the redesign 
process. Reengineering is the "fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business 
processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical contemporary measures of 
performance such as cost, quality, service, and speed" (Champy, 1995). Applying this to 
safety requires a reassessment of potentially obsolete rules and assumptions that govern the 
way safety is managed. Boehringer (1996) has developed a process model called a "state 
change chart," in augmentation of the reengineering process, to use in development of a 
process vision. It allows the user to list the "ideal" as an output of a system so that the user 
can develop the input list to close the gap as a practical way of reaching the output or 
desired state. Manganelli and Klein (1994) have developed a five stage process for using 
reengineering methodology to facilitate change. These are similar to Fahey and Randall's 
(1994) reconfiguring operational processes in strategic change. The five stages are: 
1. the preparation stage is designed to produce a mandate for change by mobilizing 
organizing, and energizing the people who will perform the reengineering; 
2. the identification stage emphasizes understanding a customeroriented process; 
3. the vision stage is the development of a process vision capable of achieving 
breakthrough performance; 
4. the technical and social design stage specifies the description of technology, 
standards, procedures, and systems for the managed change and 10 
concurrently specifies the description of the social elements and their 
development for an effective interface with the technical changes; 
5. the transformation stage includes development of both the pilot and full 
production versions of the reengineered process(es) and the continuous change 
mechanism. 
Davenport et al. (1996) defines the knowledge or information worker's primary 
activity as the acquisition, creation, packaging, or application of knowledge or information. 
The most effective course in managing knowledge or information workers is using a 
participative model. This is somewhat of a departure from strict reengineering methodology 
which requires a strategy for achievement of commitment through mandate (Champy, 
1995). Katzenbach and Smith (1993) suggestthat teams outperform individuals acting 
alone or in larger organizational groupings, especially when performance requires multiple 
skills, judgments, and experiences. 
Dicle (1969) suggests emphasizing three areas in a change process. They are: those 
related to human elements; those related tostructural elements; and those related to 
technological elements of the organization. 
The human elements are: 
improving individual interpersonal capacity 
improving individual skills and relevant organizationalknowledge 
development of mutual trust and personalcommitment 
effecting value change through openness and collaboration (consensus) 
improving intragroup and intergroup understanding 
The structural elements are: 
maximizing participation in organizational decision-making 
maximizing free and open communication 
minimizing the hierarchy of authority  
minimizing all other rigid hierarchical structures organization-wide  11 
The technological elements are: 
application of systems theory to organizational study 
adoption of integrated information systems 
Utilizing these objectives can maximize flexibility and adaptation for assurance of 
congruency and integration of a function into a complex and dynamic environment. 
The available literature provides concepts and models to facilitate incremental 
examination of the problem and completion of the subproblem tasks. However, this study 
in total exhibits a comprehensive application of ideas across multiple disciplines to examine 
congruency and integration of safety in a specific, dynamic environment using a uniquely 
designed case study methodology. The development of a subsequent conceptual 
framework for the design of safety provides a creative contribution to the discipline of 
safety management by offering a sound alternative view to the safety model in use at 
University X. 12 
3. METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the case 
study method selected for the study. The second section provides a discussion about data 
collection, tools developed and used for this study, and details the treatment and analysis of 
data The final section presents the criteria underlying the selection of the organization for 
investigation, and briefly describes the facility chosen. 
3.1 Selection of Case Study Methodology 
In this study, the researcher originally phrased two research questions, how can a 
safety system be evaluated at University X; and based on the findings, how can an 
alternative model be developed at University X? These original questions prompted the 
researcher to seek a research method to pursue the questions. Subsequent to posing these 
questions and following a preliminary literature review combined with the researcher's 
observations, the next two questions to emerge were: (1) how well does the safety function 
fit into the existing organization in light of the executive driven organizational changes; and 
(2) how is the safety function viewed by stakeholders (customers) both internal and 
external to University X? Reflecting on the originalquestions, it was evident to the 
researcher that Yin's (1985) three criteria for determining the appropriate use of a case 
study methodology were met. The three criteria are (1) the presence of a "why" or "how" 
question(s), (2) the lack of control the investigator would have over actual behavioral 
events, and (3) the complete focus the questions suggest regarding contemporary events in 
the organization of interest. 
In this study, the researcher desired to perform an in-depth and intense 
examination of an organizational element, the safety function, in a larger system 
undergoing planned organizational change. The case study methodology and subsequent 
qualitative handling of data allowed the researcher to bring to light important variables, 13 
processes, and interactions with the ultimate goal of recommending a conceptual 
framework for a redesign for safety. 
Research design tests to strengthen the quality of the research design were 
emphasized throughout the entire process of data collection and analysis. Reliability was 
emphasized in the constant use of "memos" (Appendices E and I), and field notes collected 
on field data from observations, documents, and interviews. The compilation of this data 
provides an historical data archive from which amethodological reconstruction could be 
done. Construct validity was emphasized through the use of multiple sources of data, 
including: observations, documents, and interviews. 
3.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
Since a case study can involve a large amount of various sources of data and 
documentation, a systematic plan for data collection is imperative. A protocol was 
developed which included the following: project objectives, field procedures to collect 
documents, observations, and interviews, and the development of the case study questions. 
Since connections among data elements were sought, "memoing" aided the constant search 
for configurations in the data that suggestedthat certain pieces of data belong together. 
These emerging analytic notions help to identify emergent themes, patterns, or explanations 
and generated ideas for further data collection (Tesch, 1990). The field procedures guiding 
data collection included items such as: planning access to key interviewees, documents, and 
observations; planning resources to take to each datacollection event creating a clear 
schedule of data collecting activities; and providing for unanticipated events. The field data 
collected included: observations, documents, and interviews. Observations emphasized 
interaction processes such as: various meetings regarding safety or a change process; and 
safety staff interaction with the university community, regulators, and unions. 
Additionally, observations preceded interviews so that the questions could be better 
framed, and so that the interviewer could have a better grasp of what information was 14 
relevant before initiating questions (Yin, 1985). Document collection emphasized 
information regarding the three organizational change processes, safety function operation, 
and formal and informal committee minutes and reports related to safety processes. 
Collection of interview data was the most challenging aspect. Data collection instruments 
had to be developed. 
In examining congruency, questions from French and Bell (1990) were adapted to 
probe for information from both the safety manager about safety processes and two 
interviewees intimate with each of the three planned organizational change processes. The 
two interviewees were selected from their association with each change process as 
evidenced from documents for each of the planned change events. A two column format 
was used with each process which included prompting questions as listed on the left hand 
side and a space for field notes on the right hand side (Appendix A). The data statements 
were constructed into a matrix (Appendix B) with the eight organizational processes across 
the x axis and the safety manager response and the three organizational change process 
elements along the y axis to facilitate comparison of process elements. Some examples of 
constructed statements placed into the matrix from the safety manager and communications 
intersection statements included: safety manager to staff - communication is mostly 
informal verbal interchange; selected information is shared with staff; staff meetings 
emphasize reporting of issues in individual staff areas; safety managerprefers staff 
communicate with organization by written, electronic, and verbal means, in order of 
preference; and safety manager sees the role of the safety function as information source. 
The treatment and analysis of data for the study of congruency were intricately 
linked from the beginning of data collection. Newly gathered data were continuously 
compared with prior information in order to identify any new direction for investigation. 
The researcher used the boxes of the matrix (Appendix B) to code and log the collected data 
from interviews, field notes from observations, and information from written documents 
into the eight processes used as core categories. This format offered a way to compare and 15 
identify aspects of processes where opportunities for congruency may be found for a better 
alignment of the management of safety with the organizationaldirection. The gaps were 
identified and alternate safety strategies were subsequently developed. Additionally, lists of 
goals were compiled from the data for each of the three planned organizational change 
events (Appendix D) for further insight into theorganizational direction as designed and 
championed by top administrators to guide organizational change processes. 
To examine the integration of the safety process an instrument utilizing broad-
based, open-ended questions was presented to individual stakeholders(Appendix C). 
Questions were derived by the researcher with customer service, process orientation, and 
systems view of the organization in mind (Manganelli and Klein, 1994; Fahey and Randall, 
1994; Dic le, 1969). The interviews were taped and transcribed. Although taping can make 
interviewees hesitant to expound on issues. Since the study was in-depth and exploratory, 
it was important to capture the entire content in precisely the context it was intended. 
Taping allowed the researcher to focus on the direction and flow of the interview rather 
than on note-taking (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). 
In addition to the safety manager, twenty other interviewees were selected. From 
observations, the organizational chart, and documents from various safety committees, 
interviewees were selected. These included: chairpersons and other safety committee 
members past and present, task force members for particular safety issues, occupational 
health nursing staff, hospital quality management, managers at various levels, line-level 
employees, human resources, and union representatives. The twenty interviewees and the 
safety manager were asked varied questions on perception, knowledge, and interaction 
with the safety function and safety processes. The responses to those questions were 
critical to the analysis of aspects of understanding the current state of safety integration 
across the organization. Inclusion of the safety manager allowed viewing the input to the 
safety process. The safety process output could be viewed from the customer 
perspective. Integration gaps were identified and strategies for closing the gaps were 16 
developed. The three subsets of the core category of integration which evolved during data 
collection were: 
1. safety communication 
2. safety management 
3. safety process 
The findings from the data for each of the three subcategories were expanded upon 
by the researcher using a "state change chart" (Boehringer, 1996). This allowed the 
findings to be seen as the desired state to achieve or the output in a process. The researcher 
then developed the input side of the process to list the strategies necessary to achieve the 
desired state and close the gap. These charts were not crucial to the analysis but added 
flexibility in conceptualizing the vision for the final model (Appendices F, G, and H). 
Interviews were arranged through either e-mail or telephone. The researcher 
introduced herself, identified her employment position, and requested an opportunity for a 
face to face interview. She also stated that this interview was part of a thesis requirement 
for her graduate program. Response was generally positive. Of the twenty-two people (in 
addition to the safety manager) interviewed, two people requested additional information 
before a positive response was received. One person requested to see the questions prior to 
meeting. Each interview was done independently and face to face. Sufficient opportunity 
was made available to interviewees to initiate other areas of discussion which they felt were 
important (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). The interview format was altered to allow for the 
assessment of the newly surfacing ideas throughout each interview process. At the 
completion of each interview an assessment was made to determine if additional people 
should be interviewed in light of any new information obtained. This technique of 
"theoretical sampling" is necessary for qualitative research in which attempts are being 
made to establish theory or, as in this case, to further develop existing concepts (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1990). Following the draft process, interviewees were given a copy of 17 
statements and the context of those statements made to provide feedback of accuracy of the 
information to strengthen the construct validity. 
Coding of data was performed line by lineusually in the margin of the transcribed 
field notes or documents. Codes are tags orlabels for assigning units of meaning to the 
descriptive or inferential information compiled during a study. As Strauss and Corbin 
(1990) suggest, data was reviewed for "empirical indicators" consisting of behavioral 
actions and events, observed and described in documents and in the words of interviewees. 
The result was a cumulative knowledge about relationships between data, categories, and 
subcategories. 
Field notes relevant to each observation, document review, and interview were 
written immediately following the event. Field notes linked the most recent information 
with previously collected data, and raised questions for subsequent data collection which 
ultimately led to clarification and depth of understanding of both direction of the 
organization based on its change processes and the currentorganizational perceptions of the 
safety management system (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). The field notes were instrumental 
in allowing a continual interplay between datacollection, analysis, reflections on the 
guiding framework, evolving understanding, and gap identification. 
The research question was made clear prior to the collection of data. The categories 
of congruency and integration were seen as critical elements to examine the current safety 
system and believed to be potentially important for the redesign of safety to improve the 
efficacy of safety processes at University X. Because these constructs proved important as 
data collection progressed, they were maintained throughout the study as the focus of data 
collection and analysis. 
3.3 Selection of the Organization for Investigation 
Given the objectives of this study, the complex facility of higher education selected 
for investigation needed to meet two criteria. First, it was important that the organization 18 
selected was in the process of dramatic organizational change. Second, it was important 
that a formal safety function be present. University X met each of these criteria. 
Knowledge of this facility and access to various stakeholders was facilitated by the 
researcher's familiarity with the organization. Organizational change over the past several 
years has been substantial. 
Three planned change events have either occurred or are occurring at University X. 
They are: (1) labor management cooperation, (2) shift to a public corporation model, and 
(3) hospital/clinic restructuring. In early 1992, the first stakeholder orientation was held to 
familiarize labor and management about the process called Labor-Management 
Cooperation, a quality of worklife program which was devised to shift labor and 
management interactions from an adversarial nature to an organizational climate utilizing 
empowerment, group problem-solving and consensus-building. In 1995 University X 
transitioned from a facility of the state system of highereducation to a public corporation. 
This enabled the institution to stand alone in terms of a financial and administrative 
structure. Hospital/Clinic reorganization/operations restructuring began in 1993. Activities 
centered on streamlining processes, cost-cutting, decentralization, information system 
upgrade, and service performance improvement. Collectively these improvements were 
designed to increase the competitive advantage ofhealthcare delivery and streamline the 
administration of the university and move University X toward a "world class" status. 
The safety manager, who has been in that position since 1983, is responsible for 
programs including: industrial hygiene, hazardous waste, asbestos, training, regulatory 
compliance, environmental health, and fire safety. On staff are five full time safety 
personnel and one half time support person. Until 1985 the safety manager was also 
responsible for worker's compensation. In 1985, a Workers Compensation Coordinator 
position was created and positioned in a different part ofthe organization. In 1995, a Risk 
Manager position was created in response to the change to a public corporation. This 
position would maintain the responsibility of managing insurance and liability issues related 19 
to the operation of this facility. Radiation Safety falls under a lateral management position 
and is outside the scope of this paper. 20 
4. RESULTS 
This chapter presents the findings regarding the current state of congruency and 
integration of the safety function within University X. 
4.1 Congruency Findings 
In examining and comparing the eight organizational processes with the safety 
management process, gaps were discovered in each of the eight process categories. 
Highlighted areas from the organizational change processes were seen as opportunities in 
understanding the direction of the organization. The findings were: 
1. In the communication process, the two major gaps discovered were: (1) the 
dominant communication strategy is compliance driven interdepartmentally, and 
(2) the intradepartmental communication is highly compartmentalized. 
From the planned change events it was evident that a communication network 
was planned early in each of the three processes, and group decision-making 
and consensus-building were emphasized; 
2. In the goal setting process, the major gap discovered was that planning has not 
been a part of the safety function strategy. In the organizational change 
processes planning was emphasized, mission statements were prepared, and 
goals were developed; 
3. Decision making has been accomplished from a hierarchical approach within 
the safety function. There has not been a focus on developing an approach to 
problem-solving. Emphasis has been on technical safety issues. The 
organization is incrementally shifting away from a command and control 
system toward other more participative management styles including self-
directed work teams; 
4. The use of a process to address the resolution of conflict has not been addressed 
within the safety function. Outside consultants have been used in the 
organizational change processes to break through bathers during various 
phases of the change process; 
5. The gap in the management of the relationship of the safety function staff 
among members is that bathers that exist have not been addressed and the 
effective working relationships have not been enhanced. The gap identified in the 
safety staff relationship with those external to the safety function suggests that 
the interface is frequently inconsistent, externally compliance driven, and 
communication effectiveness is limited. The change processes utilized a 
consensus-building team structure; 21 
6. The gap in supervisor and staff relations within the safety function rests on 
the maintenance of a command and control system of management. The 
organizational change processes emphasize non-adversarial collaboration 
between management and non-management factions to improve change effort 
effectiveness; 
7. The main gaps in the technological and engineering systems are weaknesses 
in the maintenance of information within the safety department, availability of 
information to external users or customers, and the coordination and synthesis 
of other sources of risk, danger, and loss information and data both internal 
and external to the organization; 
8. Two of the organizational change processes included strategic planning 
in the process. One of these change processes advocates strategic 
planning at the departmental level. The gap within the safety function is a lack 
of competency development of the safety leadership in strategic planning 
methods. 
4.2 Integration Findings 
The combination of a perception survey, documents, and observations provided 
insights into gaps to close for improving integration of safety processes. This data was 
coded into three areas: (1) communication, (2) safety management, and (3) safety 
processes. 
For the survey twenty interviews, in addition to the safety manager, were 
completed regarding the perception of, knowledge of, and interaction with safety processes 
across the entire University X. The survey began with questions regarding length of 
employment and historical description of the interviewee's role(s) within the organization. 
The length of employment ranged from less than one year to thirty-eight years. The various 
roles were selected to capture the broadest and most representative departments and levels 
in the organization. The remaining questions focused on gaining insights into the 
integrative aspects of safety. The findings for each of the three subcategories were as 
follows: 22 
4.2.1 Safety Communication 
Several interviewees specifically cited that communication needed improvement 
along with some aspect of the safety management process. Examining responses, one 
safety function staff interviewee stated, "I still see the environmental health and safety 
function largely being compliance driven, responding to and in situations that arise, 
not very proactive, however, the staff make a difference. In general it is pretty much 
responding to fires" (Interview, February 9, 1996). 
As evidenced here, the guiding strategy/model of the safety function is compliance 
driven. As observed there are philosophical differences within the department and other 
independent, unorchestrated strategy options are occasionally explored; however, 
intradepartmental communications are hindered because of a lack of guidance in problem-
solving past the bathers of these differences that have developed. 
The same safety function staff member commented on communication with groups 
external to the safety function when asked a question regarding the value of customer 
service: 
... I don't think we know much about our customers. When 
you are in a compliance driven environment...we are only 
paying attention to those needs that are indicated for us by 
directives, guidelines... To my knowledge we do not have 
much in the way of feedback to find out what our customers 
think about our function. My impression is that they have had 
little contact with us...( Interview, February 9, 1996). 
This perception regarding limited customer (employee) knowledge was supported by five 
other interviewees including managers from human resources, hospital quality 
management, employee health, and medical research who stated that they viewed the 
environmental health and safety department as not very visible in the organization. Without 
interaction or visibility, the researcher concludes that ongoing safety processes are meeting 
with and will continue to meet with limited success. 
There is acknowledgment at the administrative level that communication 
enhancement is necessary for effective operation as a university administrator stated: 23 
I don't think there can ever be enough communication through 
enough multiple channels of the same information, and by example 
I think that there have been improvements made in timeliness, and 
the openness of issues...with the e-mail facility and the voice mail 
facility to just update people about issues and allowing people to 
apply them maybe to their own specific setting. But I'd like to take 
it a little further. I could see a very active website for safety...I think 
that people are getting so overburdened...so tethered to their workstations 
that that is the most easy facility for them to access... That is the next step... 
almost like a daily message about what is going on in health and safety 
generally and maybe an opportunity to interact on some specific Q and A's 
on the workplace (Interview, May 5, 1996). 
Environmental Health and Safety has a website under construction, which has 
limitations for access. The administrator, in the above, is expressing a need for dynamic 
interaction as a customer in the safety process. The strategy of safety communication 
selected for use with the university populations it services can be crucial to success. With 
unmanaged communication understanding and productivity will be adversely affected. 
Persons who do not have a thorough understanding of the benefit to them of a change in 
the safety process are more likely to create a resistance to that change (Manganelliand 
Klein, 1994). 
More fully developing the safety communication strategy would facilitate the use of 
a more proactive supervisorial and managerial approach to safety. The occupational health 
nurse responded to a question regarding supportiveness of safety and health related issues 
when she said, "Most of the managers and supervisors have the employees' best interest at 
heart but they don't know or understand why something [a safety issue] is important and 
that such a program exists" (Interview, March 4, 1996). A former safety committee 
member responded, "A lot of it has to do with educating the supervisors to recognize what 
is good behavior and what is bad behavior, and then having them correct the employees' 
behavior. That is probably one of the biggest problems: just ignorance" (Interview, March 
20, 1996). The former safety committee interviewee noted that she has encountered varying 
levels of assistance from the individual safety staff. The researcher suspects the underlying 
cause is a lack of consistent strategy within the environmental health and safety department. 24 
In a labor union agreement in 1992, the labor contract bargaining committee 
developed a structure of safety teams representing geographic areas of the university to help 
facilitate two way communication for safety, health, and environmental issues in their 
areas. Although the structure was designed under the duress of the bargaining process, the 
outcome has been unremarkable and somewhat awkward. The structure was developed 
before a strategy for achieving yet to be specified goals. Whereas structure should be 
driven by strategy (Ve ltri, 1990; Peters, 1987). Now, goals are nebulous, achievements are 
minimal, and frustration is evident on the part of the safety team members. When asked 
about the effectiveness of the safety team process one safety team member responded: 
I don't see how you can do a job when you are so geographically 
separated as the areas that I have. The off campus location does 
not even know I am one [a safety team member representing their 
specific off campus locations] unless they have seen something printed. 
Initially, when I started, I was going to send a letter to everyone 
introducing myself, but I never got a list [of employees in my area]. 
I asked two or three times...so I never sent a letter. I don't feel that 
it is very effective right now. We didn't get enough training. I think 
a lot of us don't know what is expected of us. I know the labor/ 
management safety committee has talked a lot about our training, but 
they really drag their feet, mostly talk about it rather than act on it... 
Definitely [we need] more training and they [labor-management safety 
committee] need to quit stalling. .and make a decision and do something 
about it now. Definitely more communication. Maybe an occasional update 
meeting or informational meetings so that there is an opportunity 
to ask questions. So that the safety team member is not just a title but 
that we are here for a reason (Interview, March 23, 1996). 
Another safety team member has described similar communication weaknesses when asked 
to describe the effectiveness of the safety team process, "Whether this is because of my 
own not going out and seeking out information about what the safety team is supposed to 
do or... because they have not really come to me... I'm at a complete loss 
for what the safety team is supposed to do" (Interview, April 1, 1996). 
From the research laboratory environment, one interviewee provided a comment 
which strengthened the emphasis on customer need in safety and downplayed the 
regulatory aspect when she said, "Most people don't know anybody in environmental 
health and safety, so I think that if there was more involvement with the labs, not so much 25 
on a regulatory basis...but as actual consultants or advisors..." (Interview, April 25, 
1996). 
The workers compensation coordinator suggested that the method of getting 
information back to the line level employee needed improvement. In response to the 
interview question regarding the customer oriented aspect of the current safety process the 
interviewee responded: 
I could say that I see that there are areas that could be improved 
in terms of the communication the situation[s] that I am thinking 
about are when an employee has a concern and testing is done 
and that information is not communicated back to the employee[s] 
so they are upset and think no one cares, when in fact it has all been 
done. It is just somewhere and I guess maybe the supervisor or 
somewhere in that process the employee is the last to know 
(Interview, February 8, 1996). 
The risk manager interviewee made a comment related to his vision of the role of 
risk management in University X's safety processes. This comment suggests the need to 
assign accountability for losses to areas where losses are occurring, and an enhanced 
relationship between risk management and the safety function. The researcher interprets 
this as an emphasis on providing cost feedback to managers on losses and a need for 
emphasizing a creative relationship between safety and risk management. 
I believe that a good risk management program can facilitate 
that process [safety process] by properly allocating the costs of 
accidental loss and being able to quantify that loss in very specific 
terms of the cause and effect of not embracing the mission of the 
safety function. So I think that is going to be one of our primary 
challenges: to be able to communicate to people exactly what the cost 
and effect is of decisions they make on the operations side. And 
I think if we can do that I think it has been shown over and over 
again that if the risk management program can do that then you 
can have a real impact on the safety in the workplace and for the 
patients and visitors (Interview, February 10, 1996). 26 
4.2.2 Safety Management 
Management system development addresses alternative philosophical approaches to 
the safety management of University X. The safety management system is the driver of the 
safety process. There is both a local and a global dimension to it. The local dimension 
describes the management of the safety function and its internal processes. The global 
dimension describes the safety management development of managers at all levels outside 
of the safety function. 
The administrator over the safety function, the assistant CFO, offers a "giraffe 
award" to those who will stick their neck out and try something new. He stated, "I 
encourage people to step outside the box; then change can happen. There is enough 
evidence that when people use creativity it increases fulfillment; it increases constructive 
contribution, and increases cost savings as a result" (Interview, May 5, 1996). This 
perspective suggests one level for sponsorship for the safety system change model use at 
University X. Administrative sponsorship is essential for the success of a safety process 
change (Manganelli and Klein, 1994). 
The risk manager who has been at the facility for less than one year commented 
about the effectiveness of the current safety process. His comments suggest the 
inadequacies of using standard risk management statistics in planning for safety. 
My perception is based on what I've seen of our historical  
loss experience in terms of where we are having injuries  
and accidents and property damage. In comparing what has  
happened historically we have a very good loss record. We  
spend less on average than other health care institutions...  
(Interview, February 10, 1996).  
Subsequent to this, when asked about important safety issues faced by this 
institution the risk manager replied, 'We have many more workplace injuries than we 
should have... From a cost standpoint the cost of paying forwork related injuries is the 
largest piece of our total pie and so it deserves the most attention..." (Interview, February 
10, 1996). Regarding improvements that could be made to the safety management process, 27 
the risk manager stated, "On the occupational safety side the number of work related 
injuries is on the increase...I think the challenge is to create an environment that is more 
proactive..." (Interview, February 10, 1996). 
This portrays a system using a basic and limited risk management type output to 
assess the whole of a complex system. Further observation of increasing losses indicated 
some dysfunction within the current system. The flaw with the risk management indicators 
is that the trends only capture a small aspect (part of the direct costs) of losses and lacks a 
comprehensive view. 
When asked about the effectiveness of the safety management system the workers' 
compensation coordinator replied: 
...we do not do a lot of proactive stuff, in terms of personnel 
and staffing. As in most places, a lot of it is responding to 
problems...It would be nice to have some sort of overall plan. 
To work toward and encourage some sort ofproactive activities 
that would fit into that plan that would hopefully reduce the work 
you are doing at the tail end (Interview, February 8, 1996). 
The term proactive management, as defined by F. David Pierce (1995), is a method of 
management where daily activities are the result of a planned course of action. The use of 
planning does not appear to be a priority within the safety system at University X. A 
hospital administrator responded to a question regarding the idealness of a compliance 
driven system as used at this facility. He said, "I don't think the ideal will happen unless 
there is some incentive causing it to happen." 
As described in chapter one, a reactive system is not a successful system of 
management. The legacy system of safety management at this university is a reaction driven 
management system. This is exemplified in a statement by the Occupational Health Nurse, 
"... a lot of what this institution does in terms of health and safety of its employees 
regardless of which department ... is that we put out fires. We don't have a really good 
comprehensive preventative program in anything." Furtherevidence of a compliance driven 
system came from the safety manager when he stated, "...take for instance Sterile Supply 
when the ethylene oxide rules came down. Then the safety function and the code 28 
compliance function did provide an element of safety from exposure of ethylene oxide 
from... [those] employees...This statement emphasizes the state of the safety function, that 
is, it does not provide safety until it is required to do so. 
4.2.3 Safety Process 
Safety processes are systems, that is, combinations of functions. Safety processes 
are the complex and continuously evolving interactions ofvertically and horizontally 
integrated functions within a system that accept ownership and move proactively toward 
quality improvement. Emphasizing the process, shifts the accountability system from a 
staff safety responsibility without authority to a line responsibility with authority. This 
minimizes externally driven conformance initiated by the safety function and directed to 
other functions. It is a shift away from a system emphasizing conformance to regulations 
and toward a system of performance that adds value to the organization. 
Moving away from a functional to a cross-functional approach of operating and 
problem-solving has been identified as an effective and efficient method to both improve 
processes and customer satisfaction (De Rose, 1994). The occupational health nurse 
identified barriers to efficacy of that operation: 
My responsibility for employees is on an individual basis...  
fragmentation...infection control is responsible for the exposure  
incident, and I am responsible for the exposed employee...they  
track if multitudes of people were exposed to something. I might  
never know it except that I'd notice that we had more than one  
employee [exposed]. I also serve on the hospital safety committee;  
so I hear something that disturbs me at a committee meeting...things  
that concern me and I get involved...because I'm interested in it not  
because there is any organized drive to get things accomplished  
(Interview, March 4, 1996).  
This demonstrates that at University X the many functions which facilitate assessing risk 
and preventing losses are not orchestrated and are problematic because of a high degree of 
differentiation (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). This is contrary to viewing University X as a 
system of interactive and connected elements (Dic le, 1969). Currently, the employee health 29 
function services only the hospital and clinic employee populations. The university side of 
the organization is excluded from utilizing the service without being charged for the 
service. This structure causes a probable under-utilization of the service on the university 
(non hospital) side because of the potential impact to the budget of either the schools or 
research grants. This limits the identification in areas of risk, danger, and loss. 
The safety director of the university does not consider all aspects of risk, danger, 
and loss potentials to the university important. A hospital administrator states, "...I don't 
see disaster planning where I think it should be. Thereis pretty good cooperation from the 
safety end between the hospital and the safety group for the university. But on disaster 
[planning] the hospital is alone" (Interview, February 16, 1996). 
An observation was captured during an interview with a safety staff person. The 
comment supports the need for an emphasis on cross-functional efforts. 
Incident follow-up and investigation has a lot of holes in it. 
There is a weak link in communication between the workers' 
compensation function and the safety function and...risk manager... 
I think those are three entities that need to integrate so well that they function 
seamlessly (Interview, February 9, 1996). 
The workers' compensation coordinator commented when asked about her perception of 
the effectiveness of working relationships between workers' compensation, safety, and 
risk management. This is an example of the barriers created in a highly differentiated 
organization (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). 
I think that we have all the resources here. I don't think  
that we work as a group well. I don't think its because  
we don't want to; its just that we haven't. I think part of it is  
because we are sectioned off in groups. For example, the hospital  
is the hospital and we are not and there are different groups. The  
hospital works different[ly] from central administration. I think that  
is one big problem, and also we have all different groups who try  
to communicate, but I don't think we've been real successful...  
And I don't think we've gotten together and worked on a solution  
together (Interview, February 8, 1996).  
The infection control coordinator who is active only on the hospital/clinic side of the 
university has relayed her observations regarding where accountability should lie for health 
and safety: 30 
...I think it should be coordinated in one place and not split  
up. I think that should be dictated from the CEO down...  
...I think the scope is too great probably for one department.  
It needs to have at least a two or three person taskforce that jointly  
give direction and helps develop the goals and objectives forthe  
health and safety programs for the entire hospital and clinic  
system...I had made an appointment with the assistant director of  
[one of the research groups] who was over that committee  
[biosafety committee] and who wanted to take the whole  
issue of the exposure control plan for blood and body fluids  
to the university level so that the school ofmedicine, school  
of nursing, school of dentistry, hospital and clinics so that  
we are all doing the same thing because we share employees  
and students and it is very confusing to go from one part of  
this campus to the other and have different rules apply  
(Interview, February 20, 1996).  
This indicates some of the degree of functional isolation that exists in the various groups on 
campus and the need for an organized effort to break down barriers to improve the safety 
processes and a partnering of efforts. 
The infection control coordinator added: 
...Everybody is kind of out doing their own thing and nobody  
is really coordinating it. It [the safety process] is not a really  
well understood process and again I think that is in part on the  
hospital and clinics side. They don't or haven't seen or are only  
beginning to see environmental health and safety as a resource  
(Interview, February 20, 1996).  
The interview responses have provided clues of the ripe opportunity for 
development of safety processes across functional lines, to facilitate horizontal and vertical 
integration (DeRose, 1994). 
The labor/management safety committee has been a legacy of non-direction. 
When asked about her perception of the role of the committee, the workers' compensation 
coordinator responded: 
We've been struggling with that. I think it has definitely improved. 
Right now it serves as a way for people to voice their concerns and 
the minutes are read by everyone so it is a way to make sure that 
more people know about these things. Hopefully, in the future there 
will be a way to do some proactive kinds of programs perhaps... 
...I think we need to figure out exactly what it is we want to do... 
there is no accountability on the committee no one really 
has to do anything...we need to find some things for everyone 
to do...sort of assign some tasks and I think people would be 31 
more interested in attending because it gives them something to 
do instead of sitting around for an hour (Interview, February 8, 1996). 
The hospital administrator recommended these improvements to the labor/management 
safety committee: 
I think that when a safety issue is identified it takes so long to 
get it resolved. The solution may be easy but it is thejumping 
through the other hoops to get through our process...to actually 
get the problem solved... There might be a safety budget or some-
thing that would allow [the labor/management safety committee] to 
obtain funds to take care of the safety hazard. It could be monitored 
at the administrative level (Interview, February 16, 1996). 
When asked about the effectiveness of the current safety process one administrator's 
response suggested an approach beyond the compliancemodel. He said: 
...the combined efforts of labor and management to basically 
work toward safety oriented solutions in a non-confrontational, 
non-blaming process has been very successful...I think protection 
is more applicable in terms of what I think our program [safety] 
ought to be about. And that might go far beyond what I think 
minimal regulatory compliance is. Philosophically that is what we 
ought to be doing and if we can focus that way, we won't just do 
... the minimal because we have to, but do...from a protective 
standpoint because we ought to do. I think this will give us a 
business advantage (Interview, May 5, 1996). 
In summary, gaps have been identified through collecting data from interviews, 
observations, and documents. This examination has provided an in-depth view of the 
current design of the safety function and associated processes at University X. 32 
5. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This section provides a summary of the recommendations which evolved from this 
study. The recommendations include strategies for gap closure from both congruency and 
integration findings. The final recommendation unfolds a systematic conceptualdesign 
model for safety at University X. Concluding this section are analytical generalizations that 
the researcher has drawn from this study. 
5.1 Congruency Recommendations 
The congruency findings provided a challenge for both developing strategies to 
counteract the gaps that were identified and realigning the direction of the safety function 
with that of the organization. The following are recommendations for each of the eight 
organizational processes examined: 
1. To move the alignment of the safety function closer to the direction of the 
organization, a shared, open communication process, minimizing 
compartmentalization and maximizing intradepartmental communication and 
information sharing combined with an emphasis on contribution to the success 
of the organization would enhance the fit of the safety function within the 
University X environment; 
2. To align the management of safety with current management philosophy and 
strategies used in change processes, the use of planning would facilitate a 
movement of safety toward a more proactive approach; 
3. To better align the safety function, a more participative approach toward 
decision-making intradepartmentally and investment in elevating the 
competency of the safety staff in the standard problem solving process 
through the use of an available in-house team would improve effectiveness; 
4. To better align the safety function within the organization, the investment in 
the safety staff to develop competency in conflict resolution would enhance the 
interface effectiveness of the safety function staff both internally and externally. 
Internal consultants are available to enhance this process; 
5. The use of a team model within the safety function could enhance relationships 
both internal and external as well as improve individual effectiveness; 
6. Shifting the leadership of the safety function toward a facilitator role in the 
development of a team process, as stated in number five, could eliminate the 33 
internal adversarial relationships currently present and move toward better 
congruency with organizational direction; 
7. An information system upgrade to better serve customers was a vital part of one 
of the organizational change processes. Placing an emphasis on development of a 
system of information acquisition, maintenance, synthesis, and availability could 
enhance safety function operation, and safety decision enablement both inside and 
outside of the safety function; 
8. Competency development of the safety function leadership to include aspects 
of strategic management in its overall plan would enhance a shift from an 
external compliance driven model toward an internally driven performance model. 
5.2 Integration Recommendations 
The integration findings provided a challenge for developing countermeasures for 
the gaps that were identified. The following are the strategies developed in each of the three 
integration categories: 
1. Activities identified to close the safety communication gaps were: enhanced 
communication among safety function staff, enhanced communication 
between the safety manager and the safety staff, enhanced communication of 
both the safety manager and the safety staff with outside departments, effective 
marketing of the safety function as a resource, defining the role of the safety 
function in the communication process, and communication strategy based on 
non regulatory issues. These recommendations have been reconstructed into the 
output of a "state change" model (Appendix F) described in Boehringer (1996); 
2. Activities identified to close the safety management gaps were: the use of 
planning to improve the efficacy of the safety function, moving from a reactive 
to a proactive approach to safety, manager education in safety decision -
making, gaining upper level administrative support, safety staff development, 
and developing strategic indicators of success. These recommendations have been 
reconstructed into the output of a "state change" model (Appendix G) described 
in Boehringer (1996); 
3. Activities identified for closing the safety process gaps were: capturing 
cross-functional opportunities, developing an improved way to accumulate, 
assimilate, and disseminate resource information, and leadership development 
in the overall safety process. These recommendations have been reconstructed 
into the output of a "state change" model (Appendix H) described in Boehringer 
(1996). 34 
5.3 Recommendation for the Design for Safety 
In moving toward model development, the researcher has drawn clusters of 
information from the research data The three critical areas of distilled improvement 
areas that have been identified are: 
1. congruency recommendations (Section 5.1) 
2. integration recommendations (Section 5.2) 
3. list of goals of planned organizational change (Appendix D) 
The opportunities identified from these three critical areas will be further distilled, 
synthesized, and integrated into developing a safety design model. The intent of the 
model is to maximize the congruency of the safety function and processes within a 
dynamic organizational environment and to optimize its integration both vertically and 
horizontally into a complex and highly differentiated organization. 
The guiding models for the selected change methodology is the Manganelli and 
Klein (1994) model, the Fahey and Randall (1994) model, and the Dicle (1969) model. In 
the researcher's model, safety core process change employs a three stage methodology that 
enables the safety leaderthip to redirect safety by making radical changes in strategic and 
value-added safety processes. Dicle (1969) in his goals for organizational change 
emphasizes three elemental areas of importance: human, structural, and technological, all of 
which provide guidance for safety function development. The following describes the three 
stages of the conceptual framework for the model developed by the researcher: 
5.3.1 Stage 1 - Preparation 
The four steps that comprise the preparation stage are: 
1. developing a high performance safety team to facilitate the change; 
2. performing an assessment to determine the current state of the safety 
system; 35 
3. developing safety management process goals and objectives 
aligned with the various business processes as part of a strategic 
planning effort; 
4. discovering an advocate(s) for sponsorship of change for the 
management of safety. 
The first step involves competency development of the nuclear safety staff. 
Developing a team model suggests utilizing a common strategy. Katzenbach and Smith 
(1993) suggest a team model with performance based on behaviors including: mutual 
support, joint accountability, and a trust based relationship in addition to individual 
accountability; thinking, working, and doing; people playing multiple roles and working 
together on continuous improvement; people helping shape direction, and learning; 
aspiring to personal growth that expands and exploits individual capabilities. Also,Dicle 
(1969) emphasizes the human element capability development which includes: 
improving interpersonal capacity, improving skills and relevant knowledge, developing 
a high degree of mutual trust and support, and a high degree of personal commitment, 
effecting a change in values through stressing openness and collaboration, cooperation, 
consensus, authentic relationships rather than political maneuvering, and developing 
increased understanding within, and among working groups. Dicle's (1969) structural 
elements provide emphasis areas desirable to achieve as the cultural climate evolves with 
the planned organizational change which include: maximizing participation in 
organizational decision making, maximizing free and open communication, minimizing 
the hierarchy of authority, and minimizing rigid hierarchical structures organization-
wide. 
In development of the team, consideration should be given to improvement in the 
provision of information vertically and horizontally. In information redesign, decisions 
about detailed work flow must often be left to individual safety staff; however, 
Davenport et al. (1996) suggests three redesign strategies for the process of improved 
provision of information which are essential. First, the safety function can change 
knowledge itself by either reducing or creating a unit of knowledge that workers can 36 
reuse or access or by improving knowledge capture techniques. One example of using 
this redesign strategy is to develop and modularize safety technology transfer 
information. This would be helpful in a complex and diverse environment as a 
university so that the safety function can assemble the modules in different combinations 
based on the need of a specific department to satisfy both needs and requirements. 
Second, the safety function can improve knowledge work by changing the physical 
location of where and with whom people work. This change typically involves 
collocation, new or modified team structures, or new roles. An example of using this 
redesign strategy is in redefining the role of the safety staff person to what Veltri (1990) 
refers as shifting to "techno-structure specialists" engaged in management, technical and 
financial process design. To achieve this new role, investment in safety staff learning is 
essential. This mandates that group time must be made more effective. The current 
structure for monthly staff meetings which emphasizes activity reporting from each 
compartmentalized area is obsolete. Organizational and safety process understanding and 
model development are essential components for the new direction. This, in turn, must 
manifest into both a better fit and integration into all components of the university 
through the changing interactive role with departments outside of the safety function. 
Third, the safety function can use technology to bolster knowledge work creating 
knowledge bases and enabling communications infrastructure and applications. An 
example describing the need for redesigning safety function strategy is in minimizing 
staff compartmentalization; having separate maintenance of safety reports in various 
locations. This presents the dilemma of duplication of effort, or missing key historical 
information. Developing an information cataloging database to track and make available 
all activities is vital to the redesign. 
The labor/management cooperation process, one of the planned organizational 
change processes examined, has developed a team building module which could be utilized 
for facilitating development of the safety staff. Use of this team building resource could be 37 
augmented by using outside organizational consultants. The development of the high 
performance team model is seen by the researcher as pivotal in the success of the entire 
safety system change effort. There is no such thing as stealth change (Manganelli and 
Klein, 1994), so managed communication within and by the team is the most powerful tool 
for the success of the project. 
The second step in the preparation stage of the redesigned safety system suggests 
examination of the environment for planning the safety management model change. For 
the safety change process to be successful the safety system change team (the 
constituents of the safety function) must maintain active understanding of and open 
dialogue with all other functional disciplines both vertically andhorizontally across 
University X. The safety system change team must be sensitive to the various functional 
viewpoints, priorities, interests and needs. The method by which people of various 
disciplines receive and process information may vary from discipline to discipline 
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). This cultural knowledge may help with the success of the 
safety system change process. 
The third step in the preparation stage of the redesigned safety system change model 
suggests development of a strategic planning model at the departmental level. As part of the 
emphasis on a systems view of University X and for enhanced strategic planning and team 
competency, an understanding of the organization and its technical and social systems are 
vital for achieving both a congruent fit and successful integration. A strategic planning 
model encompasses the development of the following: strategic intent which envisions 
achievement of world-class status of a safety management system; a mission statement 
which guides decision-making toward development of that world-class status; strategic 
operations which are safety management processes including the anticipatory, value-
adding, cross-functional health, safety, and environmental resource networks with goals 
and objectives aligned with business processes (Veltri, 1990; DeRose, 1994). Planned 
organizational change goals of University X (Appendix D) are evidence of organizational 38 
direction; safety system change model goals should be parallel with the concepts devised by 
Veltri (1990) and De Rose (1994). 
The last step in the preparation stage of the redesigned safety change model 
suggests discovering a champion to support the safety change process. When 
interviewed, the administrator over the safety function said that he encourages creative 
change. However, it is critical for senior management to sponsor the project. Because of 
the broad organizational impact, there is an attending cultural shift and it is uniquely 
senior management's role to establish the culture. Successful change requires leadership 
of this most visible sort. As Manganelli and Klein (1994) point out, when creating 
change in a functional department, the safety function, special problems are possible. 
Customers of the safety process change are people in other functional departments. It is 
often more difficult to get these internal customers to cooperate than it is to deal with 
external customers. Therefore, it is critical to secure sponsorship at the executive level. 
5.3.2 Stage 2 - Identification 
The second stage is identification. This stage emphasizes theunderstanding of the 
customer-oriented safety system change model. The safety customer demands results, 
performance, and information. And those demands need to be met reliably and cost 
effectively. It becomes important to understand how various functions within an 
organization and safety processes could interact to provide an improvement in both 
safety function integration and congruency within a strategic and value-added 
framework. The steps in stage two are: 
1. identify core safety processes 
2. identify safety customers 
For the safety team to understand the scope of its mandate, core processes need to 
be understood. These core processes are the primary activities whose outputs (risk, 
danger, and loss prevention/intervention) customers need or want (Boehringer, 1996). 39 
Using Boehringer's "Process Type Chart" (1996), the researcher has evolved the core 
processes as follows: 
Core Safety Processes 
providing technical safety resources 
providing safety management resources 
providing enablement of safety decision-making 
providing the cross-functional facilitation of safety 
facilitating the development of a safety communication network 
directing safety operations research (Veltri, 1990) 
Each of these core processes should add value (customer service) and strategic 
benefit to the safety system at University X. At this facility, customer constituency is made 
up of line level employees as the highest priority customers of any safety and health 
program as well as management at all levels, other staff functions, employees at all levels, 
visitors, patients, students, resident labor unions, the immediate surrounding community, 
and the community at large. Each customer group has different needs and desires, and the 
process of designing each core process must consider this distinction. This is contrasted 
from the current system using a simple bandage application of technical and compliance 
driven knowledge in a singular microcosm of line level activity. 
5.3.3 Stage 3 - Vision 
The purpose of stage three is to develop future or "could be" safety process 
elements. This vision stage produces improvement and lists objectives for core safety 
processes, a definition of what changes are required and a statement of a new process 
"vision" (Manganelli & Klein, 1994). The distilled research data provides guidance for 
enlarging the dimensions of the core safety processes unique to University X and 
congruent with current management philosophy. The following is an enlargement of 40 
activities within each of the researcher's core safety processes. The redesign model 
elements are attached to their corresponding core safety process. 
Providing technical safety resources 
networking/accumulation of sources of service/information both internal 
and external 
competency of safety team/staff decision-making in multi-technical areas 
cost-effective application of technical resources 
efficacy of data interpretation and application 
analysis of outcome performance at both the customer and strategic levels 
(reduction of injuries, damage, ineffectiveness, non- compliance, illness,  
waste, and inefficiencies)  
effective safety technology transfer to various customer groups  
analysis of safety needs  
Providing safety management resources 
competency development of safety team/staff in advising within the current 
organizational environment 
competency development of safety team/staff in advising within various 
customer groups 
facilitating the development of safety management capabilities for all 
customer groups 
Providing enablement of safety decision-making 
comprehensive information system development to improve decision-making 
and set priorities 
development of models to prepare all customer groups 
use of benchmarking data 
Providing cross-functional facilitation of safety 
leadership development of safety team/staff in project management 
(management technique employing leadership, planning, reporting, team 
member guidance and issue resolution to guide cross-functional 
problem-solving) 
integration into all existing committee structures 
initiation of new committee structures in anticipation of emerging issues 41 
Facilitating the development of the safety communication network 
capability development of safety team/staff in understanding needs of all 
vertical and horizontal groups 
creative development of multi-approaches to aggressive communication 
strategies 
coordination of other resources both internally and externally 
Directing safety operations research in both strategic and value added dimensions 
collection/analysis/application of benchmarking data from other similar 
and different institutions 
collection/analysis/application of data to evaluate effectiveness of safety 
intervention methods 
collection/analysis/application of data to measure the financial and 
economic impact of the redesigned safety strategy 
collection/analysis/application of data to evaluate customer needs 
collection/analysis/application of data to evaluate customer service 
performance 
This model provides a radical conceptual, redesign for safety at the university 
examined. The data collected from observations, document reviews, and two survey tool 
responses offered depth of understanding to the shortcomings of the current safety system 
employed at University X and provided rich opportunities to explore an alternative model 
emphasizing systems view, process orientation, and customer service. Each of the 
alternative strategies suggested as countermeasures was anchored in significant supporting 
evidence found in business and management literature. This model offers a starting point 
from which to deepen and expand value-adding processes identified in the model. 
5.4 Analytical Generalizations 
The researcher believes that several analytical generalizations can be drawn from this 
case study. These analytical generalizations suggest that the methods used here may be 
applied as vehicles for examining other cases. The use of the French and Bell (1990) model 42 
for evaluating and comparing specific parallel processes in both the organization and a 
unique function, and subsequently, designing change to improve the efficacy of that 
function within the organization offers a way to examine congruency. The theory that 
evaluating and improving congruency or fit can improve the operation of an organizational 
function can be utilized beyond the safety function and applied to any substructure of an 
organization with the intent of planning, updating, and harmonizing functional activities. 
Petersen (1994) has suggested that to gain insight into the success of a safety 
function within an organization an employee perception survey could be used. This 
approach was used by the researcher to gain insight into how well safety was integrated 
into an organization. The theory that evaluating and improving safety function integration 
can improve safety function activity results can also be applied to other safety functions and 
other finfctions within an organization. This concept is interpolated from the evidence 
presented in organizational and management literature that understanding the needs and 
wants of the population served, and developing a strategy to provide a high level of service 
can leverage value toward success of an organization. 
Aspects of viewing an organization as a system, an emphasis on customer 
service, use of viewing activities as processes, and an emphasis on employee investment 
and satisfaction dominate the business and management literature regarding predictors 
for achieving organizational success. The theory that viewing the safety function as part 
of a larger system is crucial to developing processes for serving various populations 
associated with an organization is a predecessor to evaluating, designing, and 
implementing any change in strategy for that function. The previous theory components 
can be applied by other safety functions in various organizational environments. With 
this concept in mind, the chance of a more thorough understanding of the environment 
in which a safety function must thrive is greatly improved. 43 
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APPENDIX A 
Organizational Process Survey Tool 
1. Communications patterns, styles and flows: 
Information sought: 
Is communication directed upward, downward, 
or both? Are communications filtered? Why? 
In what way? What is the climate of communi-
cation? What is the place of written vs. oral 
communication? Include within the group/ 
committee, and between group/committees and 
general constituency. 
2. Goal setting 
Information sought: 
Does the group/committee set goals? How is 
this done? Who participates? Are both long and 
short goals set? Has a mission been developed? 
How are skills developed for effective goal 
setting? Who was involved in the process? How 
are criteria to measure developed? 
3. Decision making, problem solving and action 
planning. 
Information sought: 
How are decisions made? How are skills 
developed? 
4. Conflict resolution and management 
Information sought: 
Include interpersonal, interpersonal, intergroup.  
Where does conflict exist? How is it being  
managed?  
Field Notes: 47 
APPENDIX A (Continued) 
Field Notes: 5. Managing interface relations 
Information sought: 
What is the nature of the relations between groups/ 
committees? Are goals clear? Is responsibility 
clear? What major problems are encountered? What 
structural conditions promote/mhibit effective 
interface management? 
6. Supervisor - staff relations 
Information sought: 
What is leadership climate? What problems arise? 
7. Technological and engineering systems 
Information sought: 
How is information managed? How are policies and  
procedures developed and used? How current is the  
technology used?  
8. Strategic management: 
Information sought: 
How is the future incorporated into the change or  
safety process? What are unique strengths and  
competencies of the group/committee? What are the  
threats to the group/committee? How is the long  
term viability of the organization affected?  APPENDIX B  
Organizational Process Analysis Matrix  
Supervisor  Technology
Commun- Goal  Decision- Conflict  Interface  Strategic Staff  and 
ication  Setting  Making  Resolution  Relations  Engineering  Management Relations 
Systems 
Safety  
Management  
Labor  
Management  
Public  
Corporation  
Hospital- 
Clinic  
Restructuring  49 
APPENDIX C 
Perception/Knowledge/Interaction Survey Tool 
Demographics 
How long have you been with this university? 
In what capacities? 
What is your current role? 
Perception-knowledge-interaction 
In your opinion where does accountability for health and safety lie? 
What is your current perception of the role of Environmental Health and Safety 
on this campus?  
How would you describe the effectiveness of the safety process on this campus?  
Do you see a need for the current safety process to be customer oriented?  
Why? or why not?  
Have you had occasion to become involved in any capacity on a safety related  
issue?  
If yes, please describe the process.  
Was there a satisfactory resolution? (were all parties satisfied?)  
What programs/processes do you see as being related to safety?  
In general, do you believe that managers and supervisors are supportive of  
health and safety related issues? 
In general do you see managers and supervisors take a proactive role regarding 
health and safety issues in dealing with their staff? 
In your opinion what are the most important safety issues faced by this 
university? 
Are you a member of any committee(s) that address safety issues on this campus?  
If yes, which one(s)?  
Do you receive minutes from any safety committee on campus?  
If yes which one(s)? 50 
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For each committee, how did you become involved with the committee(s)?  
What do you think is the role of this committee?  
Would you like to see changes in the structure or functioning of the(se)  
committee(s)?  
If yes, what changes?  
If yes, why?  
Do you see any challenges to the process of improving the committee(s)?  
Do you see improvements that could be made to the safety process onthis campus?  
How do you think the safety process currently contributes to the long term  
objectives and goals of this university? 
End of interview: 
Are there any other aspects of the safety process at this university that I have 
neglected to ask about? Or that you would like to comment on? 51 
APPENDIX D  
Planned Organizational Change Goals  
Labor/Management Cooperation Goals 
1. enhance quality of customer service 
2. continuous improvement of quality of worklife 
3. continuous improvement in the effectiveness and quality of work performance 
4. development of joint labor and management consensus building 
5. development of joint labor and managementproblem-solving 
6. movement along a continuum at the departmental level toward self-directed 
work teams 
7. development of in-house facilitation teams forquality improvement 
8. movement toward the use of strategic planning at the departmental level 
Public Corporation Goals 
1. increase efficiency of operation 
2. ability to make decisions at the level of deepest understanding of 
organizational needs 
3. inclusion of labor/management cooperation principles 
Hospital/Clinic Restructuring 
1. economic streamlining of operations using economic indicators 
2. increase competitive advantage 
3. inclusion of labor/management cooperation principles 52 
APPENDIX E 
"Memo" Sample 
1/28/96 
MEMO TYPE 
Memo 1 Preliminary 
INTENT 
To focus on objectives of research and to stimulate thought of analysis and data 
collection along these lines 
COMMENTARY 
Want to develop an operational model for a safety management function at 
University X. Want to discover model framework using systems concept. Need to examine 
case study methodology and qualitative analysis. Want to look at process alignment with 
ongoing organizational change. Need to look at perception of the safety management 
function to understand fit. Use of interviews, documents and observations. Use of in vivo 
and constructed information. Who to interview for planned change? Who to interview for 
perception? Need to develop tools for interviewing. APPENDIX F  
Safety Communication State Change  
INPUT REQUIREMENTS  TRANSFORMATION  REQUIREMENTS 
Irniii01:iidiutradeportrnental State I. Sub-optimal communication DelMogiisafety communication  comomnication performance identified  .....,. 4#0Y*MAPZY based on 
.  
strategic and value added criteria  
..:.:**Partmentai 
commutheation State l 6orporabotttrtystemsz .........  ..............................................  ..........  Develop safety communication  pRess;  
network structure emphasizing   opwnization of communication  
cross-functional arrangements  
and bOtiron  
State 3. Valu64 
, Develop saftev staff communication  sh-ategtc gains in  pfocesk: 
Rfinc&l role of the safety ftlilt1100. catObilities based on redesigned 
.  .
in the communication procest*::-.*:,:*:, strategy and structure 
:000:01:0: Envt, 
approach 
This shows a communication state change chart where the "output requirements" have been distilled from the research findings, 
and the "input requirements" were developed as needed elements for achieving the "desired outputs". The state change steps are 
shown in the "transformation" column stating the broad steps or "state changes" needed to achieve the process (Boehringer, 1996). APPENDIX G 
Safety Management State Change 
State I. Sub-optimal 
management system identified 
I3evelop strategic and value driven 
oty maDagement sy 
Sta.*  co  ration of 
custorprppn00.8 for 
0#00n of S  'management 
. ........  ..................................... 
De.i.Olopeditnanag4100.0000.. ..................  ...................... 
staff  in human, 
tal arenas 
This shows a safety management state change chart where the "input requirements" have been distilled from the research findings and 
the "input requirements" were developed as the neded elements for achieving the "desired outputs". The state change steps are shown in 
the "transformation" column listing the broad steps or "state changes" needed to achieve the process (Boehringeg 1996). APPENDIX H  
Safety Process State Change  
:i use  State 1  .00:00k safetyprocesg
.......  ......................... 
and intent in  pe 004 ha: dents 
State 2 :.:Tri.0014X3rAti06.::::6f.:'*giiiiii;::" 
pnxess, and Gusto er concepts 
y.a10e: 
in safety process deve  vent< 
This shows a safety process state change chart where the "output requirements" have been distilled from the research findings 
and the "input requirements" were developed as needed elements for achieving the "desired outputs". The state change steps 
are shown in the "transformation" column stating the broad steps needed to achieve the process (Boehringer, 1996). 56 
APPENDIX I  
List of Definitions  
Coding - The attachment of meaningful labels to data chunks of varying size-words, 
phrases, sentences, or whole paragraphs. Coding is analysis. It begins at the collection of 
the first piece of data. The initial data are written up, and reviewed line by line, typically 
within a paragraph. Beside or below the paragraph, categories or labels are generated, and 
a list of them grows. The labels are reviewed and, typically, a slightly more abstract 
category is attributed to several incidents or observations (Strauss, 1987). 
Competency - According to Fahey and Randall (1994) competency can be represented by 
an equation as follows: competency = (bundling of technology) x (management of complex 
processes) x (facilitation of vertical and horizontal learning). 
Congruency - The term fit, congruence, or alignment refer to the extent towhich the 
behavioral or organizational requirements and the constraints in one part of a system are 
compatible with those in another (Harrison, 1987). The researcher sees the challenge for a 
safety manager as working toward behavioral and organizational compatibility of the safety 
function within it's unique organizational environment. 
Construct validity - This establishes correct operational measures for concepts being 
studied. Case study tactics that emphasize construct validity are: using multiple sources of 
evidence, establishing chain of evidence, and having key informants review draft case 
study report (Yin, 1985). 
External validity - This establishes a domain to which a study's findings can be 
generalized. This suggests development of analytical generalizations where the investigator 
is striving to generalize a particular set of results to some broader theory (Yin, 1985). 
Gap - The difference between the present state of safety and some future or ideal state of 
safety (Boehringer, 1996). 
Grounded theory - The discovery of theory from the data through the general method of 
comparative analysis. Qualitative data is placed into categories and then, through constantly 
comparing the content of them, defines the properties of the categories until they have taken 
on an abstract form (Strauss,  1987). 
Integration - The more tasks, technology, and environments of other units vary from one 
another, the more the structures become differentiated. Once organizations become 
differentiated internally, they face serious problems of integration (Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1967). The researcher sees the challenge for the safety manager as discoveringand 
working around barriers vertically and horizontally. 
Memoing - The documenting of emerging analytic notions which help to identify 
emergent themes, patterns, or explanations and generate ideas for further data collection 
(Tesch, 1990). 
Reliability - This demonstrates that the operations of a study can be repeated. Case study 
tactics that emphasize reliability are: develop a case study protocol, and develop a case 
study data base (Yin, 1985). 